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1.?Introduction
In 2005, Cisco Systems, Inc. (subsidiary of 
Cisco in Japan), a worldwide leading company in 
information networking technology, announced 
that it had reached a fundamental agreement to 
enter into a strategic alliance with Fujitsu, one of 
the leading providers for IT-based business solu-
tions in Japan. Under this strategic alliance, Cisco 
and Fujitsu would carry out joint development of 
high-end routers, plan future cooperation in rout-
ing and switching, and collaborate on continuous 
quality improvement, in order to enhance support 
and service within Japan. “Partnering is a strate-
gic imperative for companies such as Cisco and 
Fujitsu to address service providers’ and enter-
prise customer requirements,” said Mike Volpi, 
senior vice president of Cisco’s Routing Technol-
ogy Group. “Forming a strategic alliance with 
Fujitsu enables us to combine resources so we 
can deliver on those requirements with value-
added, industry-leading networking solutions” 
(Waltner 2004).
Cisco currently has strategic alliances with 
over a dozen companies, including IBM, Hewlett-
Packard, Intel, Microsoft, BearingPoint, EDS, 
Capgemini, Italtel, Ericsson, Siemens Mobile and 
Motorola. Cisco now works with thousands of 
companies in order to aid all aspects of its busi-
ness, including marketing, training, sales, 
research, manufacturing and services.
This alliance however marked the first time 
Cisco had collaborated with another networking 
equipment manufacturer in developing technolo-
gies for a core software base. As part of the new 
multi-year strategic alliance, Fujitsu and Cisco 
would establish a joint engineering team focused 
on adapting Cisco’s high-performance network-
ing equipment for the Japanese market. By part-
nering with Cisco and folding Cisco’s high-end 
equipment into its product line, Fujitsu would be 
able to address a greater range of its customers’ 
needs.
Until that time 100% of Cisco’s sales had been 
through distributors. Moreover this involved 
simply selling US-made products in their original 
form, with very little customization being made 
for the Japanese market (Kageki 2004).
It can be said that Cisco had adopted a new 
strategy in the market for Japanese telecommu-
nications carriers. However my research, carried 
out over more than three years, illustrates there 
is a deeper strategy. In this paper, I will reveal 
the strategic behaviour of Cisco in Japan. This 
strategic behavior dictates Cisco’s standardized 
sales strategy. This paper contains the following 
three sections. First I will describe the strategic 
alliance between Fujitsu and Cisco. Secondly. I 
will look at Japanese “sales style” and Cisco’s. I 
will then proceed to look at how Cisco still 
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maintains its standardized sales style when com-
pared to Japanese firms. Lastly I shall discuss the 
implications of a standardized sales style.
2.?Cisco’s Strategic Alliance with Fujitsu
During the 1990’s, Nippon Telegram and 
Telecommunication Company (hereafter NTT), 
the largest communication carrier in Japan, was 
generally speaking, not interested in internet 
technology. Moreover, established NTT engi-
neers tended to ignore what they considered 
ambiguous technologies for a long time. As far 
as advanced technology developmental concerns, 
NTT initiated and organized subcontractors, 
called the “NTT family.” In the NTT family, 
Fujitsu, NEC, and Oki were given detailed 
specification sheets and designs, even as far as 
specific blueprints. They produced large switch-
boards, generating sales of more than 100 billion 
yen (approximately 12.5 billion CHF). Since they 
acted as subcontractors for NTT, they did not 
develop their own Internet Protocol (IP)-based 
products.
In contrast to NTT’s forecast, usage of IP-
based technology increased very quickly, Subse-
quently, Japan’s broadband network market 
spread quickly throughout 2003. Resulting in 
major telecommunication carriers rushing to 
build the next-generation IP networks. In Septem-
ber 2004, KDDI the second largest telecommu-
nication company in Japan, announced plans to 
implement IP technology throughout its entire 
telephone network. This was followed by the NTT 
Group in the following December. NTT tried to 
construct a new IP based network system, which 
was called the Next Generation Network (NGN). 
The NGN would include all communication ser-
vices such as telegrams, telephones, mobile 
phones and even broadcasting. The estimated 
amount of required investment at that time, was 
more than 5 trillion yen (Approximately 62.5 
billion CHF), NTT would fund this investment by 
itself without partners. The amount of anticipated 
investment required to develop this market would 
be much larger than the above figure. Cisco had 
positioned the CRS-1, and announced just in May, 
that a product that formed as the core of next 
generation IP networks. Fujitsu’s technical exper-
tise and understanding of the market would give 
Cisco invaluable insight into the country’s 
advanced IP networking requirements and the 
requirements for advanced networks in other 
countries and regions outside of Japan.
Unfortunately for Cisco, Japanese major 
telecommunication companies did not employ 
standardized products, they always required 
customized products and services. Even though 
Cisco’s routers and switches were very well-
known and had stronge reputations for reliability, 
NTT assigned the development of Session Initia-
tion Protocol (SIP) Servers to NEC and Oki. 
“Telecommunications service provider networks 
must support the highest quality service levels 
and be built upon the best technologies available,” 
said Chiaki Ito, corporate executive vice presi-
dent, Fujitsu Limited.
The reason Cisco had been quick to establish 
a framework to release the CRS-1 into the 
Japanese market was that if the company “is able 
to respond to the harsh demands of Japanese 
telecommunications carriers, it would be easier 
to deploy the products around the world,” said 
Kurosawa, the President of Cisco System Japan. 
“Fujitsu and Cisco have unparalleled technology 
depth, and through the joint development and 
other collaborative efforts we are embarking 
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upon, we will be able to address service providers’ 
needs with even higher quality systems and 
innovative solutions.”
Cisco was evolving from the approach of 
simply selling products developed in America, to 
a method involving the “hybridtization” of 
Japanese partners to provide products that met 
the needs particular to the Japanese market. 
These companies would collaborate on develop-
ment of Cisco’s IOS-XR operating system for 
multi-terabit routers. This was the first time Cisco 
had joined with another communications equip-
ment manufacturer in router operating system 
development. By combining their engineering 
depth, Fujitsu and Cisco would be able to acceler-
ate the development of features critical to 
Japanese service providers and large domestic 
enterprises. Fujitsu would offer Fujitsu and Cisco 
co-branded routing products running IOS-XR to 
telecommunications service providers in Japan. 
Capitalizing on the technological expertise it had 
accumulated in its telecommunications equip-
ment business, Fujitsu would respond to the strict 
quality demands of Japan’s telecommunications 
service providers by offering networking systems 
with even higher levels of reliability. Fujitsu 
planned to release the first co-branded product 
in the spring of 2005.
3.?Cisco and Japanese Sales Style or 
Defining “Eigyo”
As well as adjusting its product development 
choices to Japanese customers, Cisco also had to 
adjust its sales methods. Cisco is known as 
employing direct sales techniques, such as get-
ting orders through internet and direct calls. In 
Japan however Cisco did not use direct sales 
techniques, rather “high touch” sales. High touch 
sales are characterized by the assignment of 
some roles dependant upon Cisco’s Japanese 
partners. Cisco’s partners played the part of 
“Eigyo.”
Eigyo can be described as a kind of sales 
force that is characterized by three factors. These 
are customer relationship managers, cross func-
tional integrators and marketing strategists. In 
Japan most companies setup their sales force as 
a core functional unit. In Chinese characters, 
Eigyo is written as two characters (Figure 1). One 
is Ei, meaning to carry out an enterprise, to 
conduct business or to engage in trade. Another 
one is Gyo, identically meaning business-related 
work and respective duties. This Eigyo concept 
describes the Japanese sales concept quite well. 
That is Eigyo means making the business, not 
just sales alone.
One of the biggest problems in terms of 
Eigyo is the high costs it generates. It is natural 
and normal for costs to be high because a high 
number of sales personnel are assigned to a 
single specific customer. For instance, it was said 
Fujitsu assigned a hundred Eigyo personnel to 
NTT (Nikkei System Provider, 2000.6.). Contrast-
ing with this approach Cisco did not dispatch 
such huge number of sales personnel to a specific 
customer.
Figure 1 Chinese Characters meaning sales
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Figure 2 illustrates Cisco’s sales strategy 
titled “high touch sales”. It was constructed with 
Cisco’s personnel and partner’s. Cisco’s sales 
personnel did not sell any products, but told their 
experiences such as practical utilization of IP 
phones, video conference systems, or other inter-
net tools and gave detailed accounts of the pro-
cesses that positively changed their work styles. 
Compared to Cisco the Japanese partners shoul-
dered a considerable amount of workload. Cus-
tomers repeatedly asked for customization of said 
products they would buy and would reveal their 
particular requirements to the sales personnel. 
Cisco, on the other hand, did not perform any 
modifications to adjust to the requests of its 
customers, but their partners did. “Typical of 
Eigyo was to create an environment in which my 
customers could talk frankly” said one of the 
biggest partners, Net One Systems’s personnel, 
“our system engineers (SEs) would always like 
to know customers problems and to discuss how 
to address solutions with them directly. So, Eigyo 
personnel tried to setup this kind of environment 
for them. Japanese Eigyo personnel did time-
consuming jobs such as building-up of friendship 
among their customers and SE.
On April the 9th 2009, Cisco announced a 
brand new strategic alliance with Fujitsu in the 
Unified Communications field. Unified Commu-
nications are solutions for internal communica-
tion systems. “Although there are many compa-
nies who use Cisco’s network tools,” said 
Kawaduma, senior director of Fujitsu, “it dosen’t 
integrate with existing systems. We do perform 
as a intermediary with Cisco’s tools and cus-
tomer’s existing systems to build a true Unified 
Communication through this alliance.” Fujitsu 
may have to perform time-consuming roles such 
as acting as an Eigyo facilitator here.
4.?Interpretations and Implications for 
Further Discussion
Strictly speaking, we have to say that Cisco 
Systems adjusted its sales approach/style for its 
Japanese customers. Cisco Systems employed 
what we consider “high touch sales” style, which 
was not the same sales approach utilized by Cisco 
Systems in the US and outside of Japan.
However we will attempt to explain that 
Cisco Systems’ sales style is still a standardized 
one and that it has a competitive advantage when 
compared to pure Japanese Eigyo. Moreover, we 
can suggest some strategies for entering into the 
Japanese market using global strategic manage-
ment in this section.
Framework for Interpretation
There is a useful framework for interpreting 
Cisco Systems’ sales style in Japan. Piercy and 
Lane (2008) described customer portfolio man-
agement. They suggested a customer portfolio 
management style where managers would try to 
make strategic sales management plans, manag-
ers would need to classify their customers. Here 
Figure 2 Cicso’s High Touch Sales Style in Japan
Cisco?s High-Touch Sales Strategy ??
a two dimensional frameworks are useful. One 
dimension is the customer attractiveness. The 
customer attractiveness is measured by customer 
sales (and prospects), dimension is a scaled from 
small to large. Another dimension depicts the 
relational requirements from customers. The 
dimension of customer relation is measured by 
how the company interacts with the customers. 
If sellers do not respond to customer’s relational 
requirements well, the relationship between sell-
ers and buyers will be low. At that time the 
relationship tended to be transactional. On the 
contrast sellers that do respond to customer’s 
relational requirements well, will have high rela-
tions and this is referred to as being relational. 
Piercy and Lane’s framework is shown in Figure 
3.
Piercy and Lane (2008) placed the customers 
in a portfolio framework. There were four types 
of customers; key accounts, major accounts, 
middle market and direct channel. Key account 
customers are placed in the top right corner, 
where the position is characterized by large 
customer sales and high relation needs. Sellers 
should provide a key account manager to these 
customers. Key account management is charac-
terized by deep and continuous relations with the 
customer. Major accounts are expected to have 
large sales, but less relational contact than key 
accounts. Direct channel customers are placed 
in the opposite corner to key accounts. This 
corner is characterized by small sales and low 
relationship requirements. So sellers do not need 
to provide a “heavy” sales force for the customers. 
In this context, the heavy sales mainly refer to 
the degree of sales management costs. These 
costs consist of many specific sales personnel, 
expertise and frequent visits. Furthermore the 
key account customers often require customized 
products. The heavy sales imply there is special 
treatment for them. Middle market customers 
often provide reasonable to large sales, but not 
so high relationship demands.
Using their framework, we can suggest the 
kind of sales approach/style may be needed. For 
key account customers, as several textbooks of 
key account management have suggested, the 
sales force must keep in touch with the custom-
ers (McDonald and Rogers 1998). They must visit 
and communicate with their customers frequently. 
Figure 3 Piercy and Lane’s Customer Portfolio (Some information added by the author)
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Compared to companies selling to key account 
customers, direct channel sellers do not need to 
organize heavy sales forces. The Relationship 
Requirements axis represents costs, and the 
Customer Sales axis represents sales volume. So 
the most efficient sales style is the top left corner 
of Figure 3.
5.?Discussion and Implications
The main finding of this paper is that Cisco 
Systems did not adjust its sales style functionally 
or virtually, even in Japanese market. As we 
showed in Figure 2, Cisco Systems did not sell 
to customers directly but their partners did. 
Moreover the partners dealt with the major and 
key account customers who had many customiza-
tion requirements. These kind of miscellaneous 
requirements make sales management costs 
higher. Cisco Systems however used its partners 
as buffers against said costs. When Cisco Sys-
tems and its partners were added to Figure 3, 
Cisco Systems was placed in the top left corner.
Though the top left corner is profitable, this 
does not mean only middle market customers are 
important. The key account customers are still 
needed. Of course these customers sometimes 
make sellers’ costs high, but they often lead 
technological initiatives. As a lead user, sellers 
must maintain these key account customers 
(Lilien et al., 2002). Cisco Systems did not sell 
any products to NTT directly, but its sales force 
visited NTT in the high touch sales process. 
Compared to Fujitsu and the other partners, 
Cisco Systems’ sales management style can be 
considered very “light.”
We often tend to think as follows, when an 
entrant would like to make new business with a 
company who has strong ties with antecedent 
suppliers, this new entrant company must prepare 
“heavy” sales forces including sales, system engi-
neers, technical advisors and so on. However my 
research showed that this type of thinking is 
questionable or debatable at best.
Implications
There are some practical implications in 
Cisco Systems’ case. First, heavy sales manage-
ment does not necessarily need to be adopted 
when key account customers requiring customi-
zation. Cisco Systems’ sales strategy is over-
whelmingly efficient. In other words, all they have 
to do is sell standardized products to its partners. 
On the other hand, Cisco Systems’ partners were 
always required to make many customizations for 
their key and major account customers. At first 
glance, the role of Cisco Systems in NTT’s pro-
curement network looked like a second tier 
supplier, however this was not the case. Second, 
if Cisco Systems tried to sell to NTT directly they 
might have encountered non-tariff barriers, such 
as “keiretsu.” A consequence of non-tariff barriers 
was the many customized orders required from 
major and key accounts. Subcontract suppliers 
may invest in specific production processes to 
customize their products for the major and key 
accounts in order to benefit from long-term 
relationships. Otherwise, cracking non-tariff bar-
riers is a very tough proposition. However Cisco’s 
case tells us that this may be the best way to 
enter the Japanese market. Through strategic 
sales management it is possible to achieve this. 
Piercy and Lane asked in the title of their paper, 
“Is sales the new marketing?” We might believe 
that yes it is.
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